Beyond the Four Rules: Rethinking Firearms Safety for Police Officers

The traditional rules of gun safety remain essential, but armed professionals might need a deeper understanding of the principles behind them.

What to Know

  • The traditional four rules of gun safety remain essential but are often taught as memorized slogans rather than deeply understood principles.
  • The first installment in a three-part series examines how concepts such as firearm status, trigger-finger placement and muzzle direction should be adapted to real-world law enforcement and defensive environments.
  • Professional firearms training should move beyond rote compliance and focus on context, decision-making and verification.

Likewise, firearms safety and training systems such as the BarrelBlok and RifleBlok allow an officer’s actual duty handgun or patrol rifle to be safely converted into a visibly identifiable, mechanically disabled, non-chambering, inert, dry-fire training platform that prevents live ammunition from entering the chamber (Law Enforcement D.R.A.W. School, 2014, BarrelBlok.com, n.d.). These tools exist precisely because higher-level training sometimes requires officers to manipulate, orient and use firearms in ways that would be wholly inappropriate if those firearms were capable of chambering and firing live ammunition. GLOCK itself describes its practice pistols as training tools intended to provide realistic handling “without any firing capability,” while the BarrelBlok/RifleBlok system is specifically designed to permit realistic training with an otherwise operational firearm that has been rendered completely safe and inert. 

Taken literally and without context, “always treat every firearm as if it were loaded” would appear to prohibit much of this training. If the firearm must always be behaviorally treated as though it can launch a projectile, then pointing it toward another participant during properly controlled force-on-force, weapon-retention, close-contact or other high-fidelity training would seemingly violate the rule by definition. Yet sophisticated training programs, such as Law Enforcement D.R.A.W. School, safely use inert and mechanically disabled platforms precisely because the firearm’s actual safe status has been deliberately established and controlled. This does not weaken safety doctrine. It demonstrates the need for greater precision within it.  

The relevant question is not whether the object looks, feels or once functioned like a loaded firearm. The relevant question is whether its current condition has been positively established and whether that condition is appropriate for the training environment. A verified inert training firearm should be managed as a verified inert training gun within a properly controlled training environment, just as a loaded duty handgun should be managed as a loaded duty pistol when operational readiness is required. Safety comes from knowing the condition, controlling the environment and matching both to the intended task, not from simple demands that every firearm exists perpetually in the same state, or pretending that it in fact does. 

This is more cognitively demanding than the traditional formulation because it requires context. A firearm being cleaned should be unloaded. A firearm being used for dry-fire practice should be unloaded, with live ammunition removed from the training environment. A firearm carried for duty or lawful personal protection normally exists in a deliberately loaded condition.  

A firearm being used with inert ammunition requires another condition entirely, because the critical requirement is not simply that the firearm be “unloaded,” but that live ammunition be excluded from the training environment. Even that distinction, however, deserves closer examination. The presence of dummy ammunition does not itself render a firearm inert. A conventional duty or defensive firearm loaded with dummy rounds remains mechanically capable of accepting, chambering and firing a live cartridge. The firearm cannot determine whether the cartridge presented to it was intentionally selected for training or inadvertently introduced into the system. If a live round enters a magazine, ammunition container or training sequence, the firearm will treat it exactly as it was designed to treat any other compatible cartridge. The U.S. Army documented precisely that kind of failure in a fatal training accident in which a live round became mixed with dummy ammunition, was ultimately chambered in a weapon being used for training and killed a soldier (Peaster, 2011). 

That is why I draw an important distinction between training with dummy ammunition and physically rendering a firearm incapable of firing live ammunition. Systems such as GLOCK’s purpose-built Practice pistols remove firing capability from the training platform altogether, while a properly installed BarrelBlok physically occupies the chamber and prevents a live cartridge from being chambered (GLOCK, n.d.; Law Enforcement D.R.A.W. School, 2014). Those approaches introduce a mechanical barrier between training and a live-fire event rather than relying exclusively on ammunition identification, segregation and human memory. Dummy rounds still have legitimate training applications, but when the exercise involves higher-intensity manipulation, close interpersonal contact or circumstances in which firearms will intentionally be oriented in directions that would be unacceptable during live fire, I want more than the assumption that only dummy ammunition is present. I want the training system configured so that a live cartridge cannot enter the chamber in the first place. The appropriate firearm condition therefore depends on purpose, and increasingly sophisticated training should seek not merely to reduce the likelihood of a ballistic mistake, but wherever practical to engineer that possibility out of the training environment. 

There is also an important learning issue here. Range culture can unintentionally teach students that completing a prescribed loading sequence is equivalent to confirming weapon status. An instructor gives the command to load. The student performs the expected manipulation. The class moves on. Because the sequence usually works, successful repetition reinforces confidence in the sequence itself. Eventually the learner may stop distinguishing between performing the loading procedure and verifying its outcome. Those are not the same thing. One is an action. The other is confirmation that the action produced the intended mechanical state. 

That difference becomes particularly important outside the controlled range. Under operational conditions, there may be no instructor standing behind the shooter, no standardized command sequence and no second opportunity to discover that the weapon was not actually in the condition the operator believed it to be. A click when a shot was expected is more than a mechanical inconvenience. In a violent encounter, it can consume the very interval during which effective action was required. The lesson should therefore be established much earlier: The status of a firearm is not something we infer from what we remember doing to it. It is something we verify. 

This distinction illustrates the larger problem with inherited range doctrine. A simplified safety rule can become so familiar that the simplification itself acquires authority. We eventually stop asking what problem the rule was designed to solve. Ritual replaces analysis, the learner memorizes the phrase, demonstrates compliance and passes the test. Everyone feels safer because the expected words were spoken, but safety ultimately depends on understanding the condition that actually exists rather than merely reciting the rule associated with it. 

That is why I prefer “always know and verify the status of your firearm” to “treat every firearm as if it were loaded.” The traditional rule remains an excellent conservative default when condition is unknown. My version adds what the traditional rule does not expressly demand: resolve the uncertainty. If the firearm should be unloaded, verify that it is unloaded. If it should be loaded, verify that it is loaded. If the firearm’s condition directly affects safety, readiness or survival, assumption is not an acceptable substitute for knowledge. 

Traditional Rule #2:  Always keep your finger off of the trigger until ready to shoot

The same problem appears in the traditional instruction to always keep the finger off the trigger until ready to shoot. Again, the intent is sound. The problem is that “ready to shoot” contains ambiguity. Ready based on what? Ready because the firearm has been presented? Ready because the sights are aligned? Ready because a timer has sounded or an instructor issued a command? My corresponding rule adds an explicit perceptual and decisional requirement: Always keep your finger off the trigger and off the trigger guard until you have positively identified your target and are ready to fire a shot (Critical Dynamics, n.d.). I also teach students to index the trigger finger high along the frame-to-slide interface, creating a consistent tactile reference point that keeps the finger well away from both the trigger and the trigger guard. 

That indexing position serves a purpose considerably more important than appearance or range conformity. Human beings do not maintain perfectly isolated voluntary control of individual muscles when startled, destabilized or exerting force elsewhere in the body. Research into involuntary firearms discharges has demonstrated that motor activity involving other limbs can produce increases in grip force and involuntary finger contractions, sometimes generating enough trigger pressure to discharge a firearm if the finger is already in contact with the trigger (Heim et al., 2006). Analyses of law-enforcement unintentional discharges have also documented incidents associated with startle responses, while earlier research has identified loss of balance, sudden protective reactions and forceful muscular contractions as circumstances capable of producing unintended trigger activation (O’Neill et al., 2018). Keeping the trigger finger positively indexed high on the frame therefore does more than satisfy an administrative rule. It creates physical separation between a potentially reflexive contraction and the mechanism that fires the weapon. 

That may sound like a minor wording and positioning change, but cognitively and physiologically it is not. It connects trigger-finger placement to information processing rather than merely weapon presentation while simultaneously acknowledging that not every muscular response occurring during a violent encounter will be consciously initiated. The trigger is not approached by the trigger finger because a mechanical sequence has reached a particular point. It is approached because perception and decision have justified the action. Until that moment, the finger remains indexed in a location that provides a repeatable tactile reference and helps protect against an involuntary contraction becoming an unintended discharge. 

There is another reason I prefer a deliberate, high tactile index, and it relates to the relationship between vision and motor action. Human movement is strongly influenced by where visual attention is directed, a perceptual-motor relationship commonly described in terms of gaze-action or perception-action coupling. The eyes do not merely observe the environment while the hands independently perform a learned mechanical sequence. Visual information helps organize, guide and continuously update motor behavior. In firearms performance, that relationship becomes particularly important when time, distance or threat conditions make a deliberate visual transition from the external threat to a sharply defined sight picture impractical.  (This topic will become the focus on an upcoming featured article.) 

This distinction becomes especially important when we consider how most conventional firearms drills are structured. On a square range, the student often knows almost everything that needs to be known before the drill begins. The target has already been designated. It is known to be a shoot target. The distance is known, the direction is known and the backstop is known. The shooter waits for a command or buzzer, performs a prescribed sequence and fires a predetermined number of rounds. Under those conditions, the decision to shoot was effectively made before the exercise started. 

Repeat that structure thousands of times and the learner can become extraordinarily proficient at responding to the start signal. What has actually been practiced, however, may be stimulus-response execution rather than target discrimination. The finger moves toward the trigger because the buzzer sounded, the target is already known and the drill architecture has preauthorized the shot. That does not make the drill useless. It simply means we should be honest about what the drill teaches and avoid confusing clean execution on a known problem with decision-making capability in an unknown one. 

Soderstrom and Bjork (2015) make precisely this distinction between performance during acquisition and durable learning. Immediate improvements in performance can occur without corresponding gains in long-term retention or transfer. In Unlocking the Brain Code, I make the same point more bluntly: “When training environments consistently favor immediate fluency, they sacrifice the variability that strengthens adaptability” (Hanson, 2026a, p. 95). The danger is not repetition itself. The danger is repetition performed under conditions so predictable that the learner becomes highly efficient at solving only the training problem. When every presentation automatically culminates in a trigger press, we may also be teaching the motor sequence to outrun the perceptual and decisional processes that should govern it. 

Traditional Rule #3:  Always keep your gun pointed in a safe direction

The third traditional rule instructs the shooter to always keep the gun pointed in a safe direction. My corresponding rule retains the concept but deliberately adds context: Always keep your firearm pointed in a safe direction, and let your operational environment determine what the safest direction happens to be (Critical Dynamics, n.d.). On a square range, “safe direction” is remarkably easy to understand. It is downrange, and terminates at the berm or backstop. Range architecture establishes the acceptable orientation, berms manage projectile containment and instructors can immediately correct deviation. 

That structure is indispensable when several shooters are standing shoulder to shoulder with loaded firearms. The problem occurs when “downrange” becomes a cognitive model rather than a range-management convention. There is no permanent downrange in a parking lot, residence, school, stairwell, hospital, traffic stop, restaurant or rapidly changing critical incident. People move. Officers move. Other officers enter and leave positions. Innocent people can occupy what appeared to be a relatively safe direction only a second earlier. Walls, windows, vehicles and open spaces change what lies along potential projectile paths. 

In an operational environment, safe direction is therefore a problem that must be continuously solved rather than a fixed geographic feature. Advanced firearms training provides another useful illustration of why “safe direction” must ultimately be understood contextually rather than merely geographically. Purpose-built training pistols such as the GLOCK 17P and 22P, along with reset models such as the 17R, exist specifically so officers can perform realistic gun-handling tasks without the firearm being capable of firing live ammunition. GLOCK describes its Practice pistols as duplicating the handling, weight, size and balance of an operational pistol while eliminating firing capability (GLOCK, n.d.). Similarly, the BarrelBlok safety system allows an officer’s actual duty or defensive firearm to be rendered inert, mechanically incapable of chambering live ammunition while retaining the dimensions, controls and handling characteristics of the weapon the officer actually carries; (Law Enforcement D.R.A.W. School, 2014, BarrelBlok.com). These systems make possible higher-intensity, higher-fidelity training in three-dimensional environments that would be unacceptable with a live, operational, or unprotected firearm. 

If the traditional instruction to “always keep your firearm pointed in a safe direction” is interpreted as meaning that a muzzle may never be intentionally oriented toward another participant under any circumstances, then much of this sophisticated training would appear to violate the rule. It does not. What has changed is the verified condition of the training system and, consequently, the definition of what constitutes a safe direction within that controlled environment. A purpose-built inert training pistol, or an operational firearm that has been deliberately rendered inert, positively verified and introduced into a controlled training environment from which live ammunition has been excluded, presents a fundamentally different level and type of risk than a loaded duty weapon. This is precisely why I teach that the operational environment must determine the safest direction. “Safe” is not an abstract geographic property permanently attached to downrange. It emerges from the interaction among firearm condition, environment, purpose and foreseeable consequences. Advanced training does not abandon muzzle discipline. It requires a more sophisticated understanding of what muzzle discipline actually means. I have personally participated in advanced training programs where students demonstrated better muzzle discipline because they more fully understood, both cognitively and physically, what proper muzzle management required. 

This is where representative learning design becomes important. Practice conditions do not have to perfectly duplicate reality, but the information guiding performance should increasingly resemble the information that comes into play when the skill is actually used. Barnett and Ceci’s work on transfer demonstrates why this is important. Transfer does not occur as a simple all-or-nothing property of learning. It depends in part on how dimensions of the learning environment correspond to dimensions of the later performance environment (Barnett & Ceci, 2002). 

Police firearms training makes this especially consequential. Di Nota and Huhta (2019) argue that police motor performance cannot be meaningfully separated from situational awareness and decision-making. An officer does not merely execute a motor program. The officer perceives information, interprets meaning, selects an action and physically carries that action out. When training isolates the movement while systematically removing the information that should control the movement, incomplete transfer should not surprise us. 

The first three traditional rules of firearms safety therefore expose a common theme. Firearm status, trigger-finger placement and muzzle direction are not merely positions or procedures to be memorized. They are problems that must be continually resolved through perception, context and judgment. The traditional rules remain indispensable, but their greatest value emerges when instructors teach the reasoning beneath them rather than stopping at the words themselves. That is where safety begins moving from administrative compliance toward durable operational understanding. 

In Part Two, I will examine the traditional command to “know your target and what is beyond it,” why I believe armed professionals should instead think in terms of a two-way arc of fire, and why a fifth rule addressing a falling firearm belongs alongside the traditional four. I will also return to Rule No. 3 and challenge another deeply embedded firearms-safety maxim: “Never point a gun at anything you don’t intend to kill or destroy.” The intent behind that phrase is unquestionably sound, but its wording creates tactical, cognitive and even legal implications that deserve much closer scrutiny when we are training police officers and other armed professionals. From there, the larger issue comes into focus: how familiar safety language, administrative range commands and highly predictable training structures can gradually become embedded as tactical assumptions, even when the operational environment bears little resemblance to the firing line. 

References 

Anderson, L. W., & Krathwohl, D. R. (Eds.). (2001). A taxonomy for learning, teaching, and assessing: A revision of Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives (Abridged ed.). Longman. 

Barnett, S. M., & Ceci, S. J. (2002). When and where do we apply what we learn? A taxonomy for far transfer. Psychological Bulletin, 128(4), 612-637. 

Critical Dynamics, Inc. (n.d.). Five rules for safe gun handling [Training handout]. 

Di Nota, P. M., & Huhta, J. M. (2019). Complex motor learning and police training: Applied, cognitive, and clinical perspectives. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 1797. 

D.R.A.W. School. (2014) Safety: BarrelBlok. 

GLOCK Ges.m.b.H. (n.d.). GLOCK practice and reset pistols. 

Hanson, K. A. (2026a, September 16). Are firearms instructors teaching proven methods or repeating tradition? Officer.com. 

Hanson, K. A. (2026b). Unlocking the brain code: Exposing the limitations of traditional firearms training and high-liability instruction through neuroscience, psychology, and human performance research. Applied Threat Science Publications. 

Hanson, K. A. (2026c, March 11). The value of being a contrarian in a conformist police training culture. Officer.com. 

Heim, C., Schmidtbleicher, D., & Niebergall, E. (2006). The risk of involuntary firearms discharge. Human Factors, 48(3), 413-421. 

Olma, J., Sutter, C., & Sülzenbrück, S. (2024). Blended police firearms training improves performance in shoot/don’t shoot scenarios: A systematic replication with police cadets. Frontiers in Psychology, 15, 1495812. 

O’Neill, J., Hartman, M. E., O’Neill, D. A., & Lewinski, W. J. (2018). Further analysis of the unintentional discharge of firearms in law enforcement. Applied Ergonomics, 68, 267-272. 

Peaster, R. (2011, June 1). From BBs to bullets. The United States Army. https://www.army.mil/article/58680/from_bbs_to_bullets 

Soderstrom, N. C., & Bjork, R. A. (2015). Learning versus performance: An integrative review. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(2), 176-199. 

Vickers, J. N., & Lewinski, W. (2012). Performing under pressure: Gaze control, decision making and shooting performance of elite and rookie police officers. Human Movement Science, 31(1), 101-117. 

Zhang, T., Harrington, K. B., & Sherf, E. N. (2022). The errors of experts: When expertise hinders effective provision and seeking of advice and feedback. Current Opinion in Psychology, 43, 91-95.

About the Author

Keith Hanson

Keith Hanson

Keith Hanson is a career law enforcement professional with extensive experience across operational and instructional domains, specializing in firearms instruction, tactical operations training, and counterterrorism tactics. With a strong background in neuroscience and psychology, Keith is a co-creator and senior program architect of NeuralTac™, which combines neuroscience, combat psychology, neuropsychology, kinesiology, and educational sciences, drawing from the latest research in human performance, to produce advanced high-liability instructional frameworks for law enforcement agencies, contract security firms, and other armed professionals.  It also aims to develop and foster advanced-level master trainers within those organizations. Additionally, as a certified Force Science analyst and certified cognitive/forensic interviewer, Keith serves as a court-recognized expert witness on use-of-force matters and provides consultation on legal strategies.  He is the author of "Unlocking the Brain Code: Exposing the Limits of Traditional Firearms Instruction and High-Liability Training Through Neuroscience, Psychology, and Human Performance Research."

You can email Keith: [email protected]

And visit his LinkedIn page: https://www.linkedin.com/in/keithhanson1973/

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