This next series of articles will cover the terrorist attack that occurred at the Beslan Middle School in Russia from September 1 to September 3, 2004. While this attack is not considered an active shooter event like the majority of the events that previous articles have covered, this event is significant for its size, duration, and circumstances surrounding the response to the attack. While the response tactics for such an event differ greatly from those used for an active shooter event, small unit tactics are small unit tactics and criminal teams are criminal teams. There was much discussion, after the Beslan siege, about whether or not our “typical” American active shooter response protocols would have worked in response to the terrorist siege. The answer was an obvious NO.
The American response protocols were developed to defeat one or two shooters who were mostly unskilled and had limited use or understanding of explosives. As the Columbine attack was the active shooter event that spawned the active shooter response movement, all too often response tactics were developed with the intention of enabling a team of quickly responding officers to neutralize two high school shooters.
- - - - - - - - - -
The remainder of this article is part of the book "Active Killers and the Crimes They Perpetrated," available in print or ebook via Amazon.
Joshua Borelli
Joshua Borelli has been studying active shooter and mass attack events over the course of the past several years, commensurate with receiving training on response and recovery to natural disasters and civil disturbances. Joshua started to outline this series of articles in an attempt to identify commonalities and logistical needs patterns for response.
