Preventing Butler and Orem, a Professional Sniper’s Perspective

On October 1, 2017 (exactly eight years before the date of this writing), a maniac went into a Las Vegas casino with an arsenal of firearms and ammunition, unknowingly delivered by bellmen, over the course of several days. He subsequently shot and killed 60 people and wounded at least 413 others at a music festival in the venue below, from an elevated position on the 32^nd floor. The panic that followed raised the injured total to approximately 867 people. His actual motive was never determined. This incident occurred during a heightened period of civil unrest in America.

Looking even further back, the author was one year old when The President of the United States was assassinated by Lee Harvey Oswald. Oswald used a surplus rifle, based on a Mauser design, fired at under 100 yards. Oswald was not a professionally trained sniper, although he did have a military background.

NOTE: Oswald also unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate a political activist before the successful attempt on JFK and also hid his rifle, wrapped in a blanket, after that first attempt. Fast forward to 2025 and here we are again.

Immediately after the mass shooting in Las Vegas, the questions asked by the police and public alike were immediate: Who? What? Where? When? Why? How? These are the same questions taught in every police academy as a basis for an accurate police report. For the introspective and tactical, these questions are often followed by the closely related: Could the event have been prevented? How could it have been prevented? What can we do to prevent it in the future? … And always, the constant bottom line, determining factor “How much is it going to cost and who is going to pay for it?”

Would we, could we, pre-deploy our own snipers/officers or technological assets to prevent or neutralize a hostile shooter/sniper in a similar situation? For answers, we should probably look again to history, as a place to start.

In 1966, Charles Whitman, fired on innocents from the rainspouts of the University of Texas clock tower which served as perfect firing loopholes on people below who thought they were safely hidden. The victims were unaware of the fact that even if you can’t see the shooter; the shooter can sometimes see you. Furthermore, due to the extreme distances and angles, many shots fired at Whitman by citizens and police from the ground went over the killer’s head and into the wall behind him; because to hit him from the ground, they would have had to fire through those same rainspouts and account for those same distances and steep angles. There were no SWAT teams in 1966 and Whitman was not stopped until an ad hoc assault was mounted on the tower deck by patrol officers and a citizen.

In 1968, Martin Luther King Jr. was killed by James Earl Ray using a common, 30-06 caliber hunting rifle, from a second story platform, at across the street distance.

In 1973, Mark Essex shot numerous people and police officers from the roof of a Howard Johnson’s in New Orleans with a common hunting rifle. Essex would safely hide in a concrete structure on the roof when threatened and was not stopped until a USMC helicopter loaded with police officers were able to get on the same level with him, catch him in the open and gun him down in a hail of gunfire. N.O.P.D. had sniper teams by this time but their training was reportedly sporadic and unstructured (sound familiar?).

The Muhammad / Malvo murders (commonly known as the DC sniper shootings) terrorized and gridlocked an entire metro area for weeks in October, 2002 until a citizen provided information leading to their arrest. Their tactics were later copied and used by insurgents in Iraq until stopped by observant USMC 3/5 Scout/Snipers.

In the confusion during some of these cases, it was initially thought that there may have been more than one shooter due to the extraordinary large amounts of gunfire and the phenomenon of ballistic acoustics in an urban environment. And as bad as the Mandalay Bay event was in Las Vegas, it would have been an even worse nightmare had it been a choreographed Mumbai/Beslan style attack by numerous committed terrorists.

So what can we do? Conducting countersniper operations in crowded American cities is no small task. With no prior knowledge of when and where an attack may occur (which is almost always the case), how do we anticipate and then locate the shooter? It can be an educated guessing game at best and an expensive and hollow “feel good” remedy at worst. But that fact notwithstanding, recent line of sight shootings of high profile people who were obviously at risk (Trump, Kirk); were in the author’s opinion, an abject disregard of common sense that any rational person with no training whatsoever could have foreseen.

Technology now exists that will identify and locate a gunshot within seconds but none but the most affluent agencies can afford it. It certainly cannot be employed at every event, in every city. Area denial beforehand is smarter than an after the fact shot location which is now simply part of a post-shooting investigation, that should have never happened in the first place. And even if the shooter is located, is it prudent to fire upon him? Can we obtain the proper angle to return fire with no collateral damage to innocents in an American neighborhood/public venue event?

Backstop issues and obtaining the proper firing angle on suspects can be extremely difficult on subjects whose location is known. Guessing where the firing is coming from compounds things greatly and guessing where to actually return fire to can be a recipe for disaster.

The subject of suppressive fire and acceptable losses is another topic that almost always comes up when law enforcement and military snipers discuss these matters. Sometimes permissible in wars on foreign soil, American law enforcement is accountable for every round fired and misses, (while they sometimes occur) are obviously unacceptably hazardous in American neighborhoods.

Much discussion has already taken place on these types of events. In a post 9/11 world, the military and law enforcement tactical communities in America have grown much closer. The law enforcement and military snipers’ respective paths and operational requirements in both arenas overlap much more often than in previous years due to the urban fighting in overseas cities. But invariably, when discussing these matters, the military (Especially SOCOM) veterans refer to the manpower, technology, equipment, weapons and air support they had available in their environment … as the cops sit silently by listening out of huge respect; but at the same time realizing they will likely never see these assets used in American neighborhoods.

This is due to several factors. First and foremost being that the rules of engagement in war are vastly different than engaging US citizens, in US neighborhoods (who may be criminal or mentally deficient or both) but who are still protected by the same constitution the police are, right up to the second the suspect forces an officer to engage them to end a deadly threat.

The current political climate weighs heavy on society and has proven to be a primary motivating factor in many criminal sniper incidents in history; and politics heavily affecting law enforcement once again, dominate the current news cycle.

An active assailant situation regarding a criminal with 4^th Amendment protections, is different than a terrorist bent on killing as many people as can be drawn into his kill zone. The killing must be stopped as soon as possible in both situations but officers are placed behind the curve when forced to determine which situation they are dealing with in real time.

Secondly, the manpower and equipment needed (Overtime pay, specialized training, night vision equipment, thermal optics, drones, etc.) is prohibitively expensive and beyond the reach of many agencies whose budgets have been cut to the bone.

Professional public venue sniper training has existed for close to a decade, as has drone surveillance capabilities. The use of drones to provide real time surveillance is a very viable and cost effective remedy for area denial to rooftops and public venues. The training in their use is easily located and procured.

Helicopters have also been used to good effect in police special operations. As mentioned earlier, a USMC helicopter loaded with cops was used to stop Mark Essex in New Orleans and several murderers have been stopped by police snipers from helicopters in Alaska and California. However, some large agencies have belayed their use of helicopters in these types of scenarios stating that the crews and birds are just as or are more likely to be shot down, as the threat is to be neutralized and the “juice is not worth the squeeze”. It is certainly an arguable topic. Aerial asset sniper training is also, readily available. But all the above are highly expensive assets to obtain and maintain current proficiency in.

Threat assessment however, is cheap and should be a staple of all modern police sniper operations. Every major venue, hospital or building where a likely threat could occur in one’s jurisdiction should be pre-assessed. Snipers should not only assess these structures from the ground but also from the tops of these structures to see what a hostile sniper may see from his vantage point. Ranges and possible firing points of snipers (both police and hostile) should be ranged, documented and logged in a sniper’s operational data book. A copy of the report/results should be provided to SWAT commanders in case it happens today. Furthermore, as in the Whitman case, threat assessment should be complete and thorough not only from a SWAT sniper’s standpoint but also in the event an entry team or group of patrol officers are forced to mount a direct assault on the shooter’s position (Austin 1966 / Dallas 2017).

Absolutely clear, immediate, secure, interruption and trouble-free communications have to occur directly between the snipers and the close protective team in charge of the protected. Life literally depends on it. Countless operations have been hampered by some officer talking about moving a barricade or some such at the worst possible moment.

Magnified optics on patrol rifles and commensurate training for patrol officers are a mandatory requirement in the modern era. There is simply no excuse for law enforcement to be outgunned in 2025. The positive effects that precise, return, ground-fire might have merits attention and also begs the question: Are your patrol rifle equipped officers capable of effective, discretionary fire, on a target 200 yards away, incurring no collateral damage? The National Patrol Rifle Conference hosted by Centermass Inc. has been the pressure testing ground in this arena for decades.

The President and other dignitaries are afforded Secret Service protective details. These snipers are trained and equipped for long range engagements. They are sometimes deployed overtly, relying on visible presence to deter a threat. This asset is funded by the American taxpayer. However, recent events show glaring gaps in manpower shortages and which dignitaries are actually afforded this level of security.

NFL and college sports events are often afforded sniper over watch protection; and in the aftermath of the Lass Vegas attack, certain music venues and entertainers hired professional over watch of their concerts for the remainder of their tours.

These situations aside, most agencies and municipalities claim they do not have the money and manpower to cover this type of over watch.

The cuts made to law enforcement training before the defund movement were detrimental. In the current era, resources and manpower are stretched beyond thin and veteran officers are leaving the profession at high levels. Hiring competent officers to previously held standards in the modern era is also proving daunting for many agencies nationwide.

The bottom line is that security is either real or merely a feel good display for appearances. Real security is expensive and ignored at the cost of human life. Having over watch qualified officers in the modern era is a proven necessity and area denial of a suspect requires manpower. This means 1. A pre-positioned officer(s) with rifles/optics. 2. Drone coverage. Or better, a layered response with both. In both Butler and Orem, one officer or one monitored drone, covering (a very obvious) line of sight rooftop would have likely prevented tragedy.

But it didn’t happen and history ignored is history repeated. They will seemingly roll the dice every time, hedging their bet that “It won’t happen here”.

The obvious line of sight threat must.be manned one way or another and the monetary cost is what it is. There was a motorcycle helmet ad in the 1970s that stated “Got a ten dollar head? … Buy a ten dollar helmet”. It is applicable in a broad range of circumstances and certainly applies to law enforcement capabilities.

The author’s friend Ron McCarthy (Sergeant, LAPD SWAT) once said “The snipers almost always get it right. It’s admin that screws things up”.

Doing nothing has proven deadly time and again and those reading this are part of the solution. But just like Columbine, that solution will require both a paradigm shift in administrative thinking and “outside the box” innovation; because what has been happening for decades, has happened yet again and once again proves … that complacency kills and that there is no “box”.