Crack Wars...
For those of us who have been patrolling the streets since the early 90's (or before), we can vividly remember what was known as the "crack wars" of that period. It seemed as if the emergence of crack cocaine in our communities was a huge drug tidal wave that hit us with little warning. I can remember working the street and noticing what appeared to be the beginning of crack use, only to realize within a matter of weeks that it seemed like every doper was on the rock. Crack cocaine use certainly has not gone away, but just when it looked like the flood waters subsided, another tsunami hits.
Meth Wave...
Ten years later I found myself working dope cases assigned to a HIDTA unit pursuing scab-faced, deranged, walking skeletons that looked like they were the real life version of some zombie horror flick. Meth had made its debut and labs were popping up everywhere. Just as fast as we could devote countless hours doing surveillance, buy-slides, tactical search warrant execution and then the tedious clean up, another two or three labs were up and running within hours, not days or weeks. Sometimes these new labs were operated by the same "meth-heads" who slipped out the back window as we rammed the front door.
Clandestine Methamphetamine Laboratory (CLANLAB) investigation was a new animal to law enforcement. Not because chemically they were dangerous (P2P, PCP labs, and others were on the scene earlier), but due to the fact their explosive growth was overwhelming. Unlike other covert labs, the meth lab growth did not diminish over time. It grew exponentially. Given the toxicity of the chemical refuse, volatile nature of the lab, and the exorbitant cost of clean-up (ranging from $2,000 to $8,000 for a bathroom sized lab), the media would often report that meth labs were "public enemy number one". The fact is most police agencies simply couldn’t afford to pay for the clean-up. Unbudgeted expenditures in the thousands kill police operations. Through creative federal ear-marks, the DEA stepped in and would absorb the entire clean-up cost as long as they were notified and their teams were given access to clean up the mess first.
Today, many factors compete for limit tax dollars available to public safety. These range from the rising cost of officer healthcare packages and gasoline for cruisers, to counter terrorism and other events. Whatever limited funds were available to combat CLANLAB operations is now even more in peril.
Universal Law Enforcement Truths...
There are two.
First truth: "If you call they will come," meaning that once a copper puts that "I need help" code over the radio the troops start rolling. If the situation is bad enough cops will respond not just from adjoining cities, but from different counties too, and the state and Federal LEO’s respond also. However, we are our own worst enemy at times, because who do cops call when cops are in trouble? More cops. More guns are not necessarily the answer when dealing with a CLANLAB. Law enforcement has to learn that we cannot limit ourselves by calling on more of us.
Second truth: "It is not what you know but who you know," meaning that police mutual aid packages are designed so that cops can call cops and that’s where it stops. The hierarchy of authority usually ends with the police chief, tactically.
In order to effectively deal with all the problems that CLANLAB's pose, the response to this issue needs taken outside the realm of law enforcement and spread out evenly among other community assets. In others words, police, fire, EMS, zoning, public utilities, health department, etc., needs to be brought into the mix. If the problem overwhelms a city's resources, then county emergency management needs to be activated.
Joining Forces...
By definition, an "emergency" is a big problem that needs to be handled immediately. Emergency Management Agencies (EMA) are the components within local, county/regional, state and federal government that coordinate the assets of the second universal truth of law enforcement. When CLANLAB clean up operations resemble those of CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive), then it's time for law enforcement to accept that they are not dealing with a localized, limited, incident that cops can handle. EMA needs to be involved for several reasons:
- Assets. Who has HAZMAT, DECON and SCBA resources that CLANLAB operators need? The fire service through their mutual aid compacts.
- Incident Command. Coordinating the multiple response of police, fire and EMS units from within the county and from outside (regional).
- Strategic planning. Exploring expansion of the police "task force" concept to include non-police resources (Fire, EMS, etc.).
- Funding. Seeking the assistance of higher level government for a new funding mechanism to offset local overtime expenditures, or other incident driven costs, as a result of the CLANLAB issue.
In our current era of living with a homeland security based consciousness, law enforcement needs to shift from the mindset of only seeking EMA assistance after a natural disaster, or act of terrorism. The Methamphetamine CLANLAB problem easily overwhelms most police agencies and falls within the category of EMA activation. Government executives also need to realize that the funding stream previously available for clean-up costs is, or will be, drying up. Why wait until the system is broke before trying to fix it? Creativity is the key to handling this problem and more resourceful effort, in addition to strategic partnering, needs to devoted to addressing CLANLAB problems. Usually, the common factor of not getting help with a problem is not that help does not exist, but that nobody asked for help in the first place.
