Reginald Scott Fennell V.

May 28, 2009
The US District court examined the facts of the case and determined that Fennell did not establish that Gilstrap violated his fourth amendment rights.

On January 28, 2007, Reginald Fennell was arrested on misdemeanor charges. He was placed into Deputy Hubbard's vehicle for transport. Fennell immediately began kicking the windows and doors of Deputy Hubbard's cruiser. To avoid damage to the car and injury to Fennell Deputy Hubbard put leg restraints on Fennell. As with most departments officers radio ahead to intake that they have a violent inmate in order to have enough officers available to control the situation.

Fennell was brought into a holding cell and he was laid on the floor. Fennell's shoes were removed along with the leg restraints. During the time in the room Fennell was threatening Deputy Hubbard. Fennell was stood up and held on the wall while the handcuffs were removed. An officer told Fennell to remove a jacket. Fennell look around in an aggressive manner.

Fennell moved his hands from the wall. Fennell was turned and put back on the wall by a Deputy Walter Huskey. Fennell's head stuck the wall. Fennell turned and moved towards Huskey with a closed fist. Fennell grabbed Huskey's arm, Deputy Gilstrap came to the room as other officers were attempting to restrain Fennell. Deputies were striking Fennell in an attempt to make Fennell release Huskey.

Gilstrap instructed another deputy to move so, he could kick Fennell arm as an alternative to methods that were not working. Gilstrap kicked Fennell in the face and Fennell gave up. A pool of blood was on the ground, and Fennell had a left orbital fracture, a septal fracture, and a nasal fracture. (R.1-30, Cartersville Medical Records at 4; R.1-23 at 25.). Following an internal investigation the Bartow County, Georgia, Sheriff Office fired Deputy Gilstrap.

Fennell filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Gilstrap alleging that Gilstrap used excessive force. Gilstrap filed for summary judgment. The US District court examined the facts of the case and determined that Fennell did not establish that Gilstrap violated his fourth amendment rights. The court granted summary judgment to Gilstrap. The case was then dismissed and Fennell appealed to the 11th District Court of Appeals.

The court reviewed the case. They addressed the issue of qualified immunity.

The qualified immunity inquiry usually involves two prongs. First, a plaintiff must show that a constitutional or statutory right has been violated. Second, a plaintiff must show that the right violated was clearly established. 6 Darnley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). For claims of excessive force in violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, however, a plaintiff can overcome a defense of qualified immunity by showing only the first prong, that his Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated. Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2002). We created this rule because, for an excessive- force violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, the subjective element required to establish it is so extreme that every conceivable set of circumstances in Which this constitutional violation occurs is clearly established to be a violation of the Constitution . . . . Id. See also Danley, 540 F.3d at 1310 (conducting qualified Immunity analysis for alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation by examining solely the first prong. We agree with Fennell, therefore, that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground that Gils trap’s use of excessive force was not a violation of clearly established law after holding that there was evidence of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment through the use of excessive force. Fennell is correct that he needed only to show that there was evidence to support a finding that Gilstrap had violated the Fourteenth Amendment to defeat Gilstrap's claim of qualified immunity, and the district court concluded that Fennell had, in fact, made such a showing. Nonetheless, the district court's grant of summary judgment is due to be affirmed because, as Gilstrap argues, Fennell has failed to show that Gilstrap's use of force constituted excessive force violating the Fourteenth Amendment.

The court then addressed the use of force under the fourteenth amendment. The court reasoned that if a use of force is applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. But, the court has to find that it is maliciously and sadistically to cause harm then it does shock the conscience and is considered excessive under the eighth or fourteenth amendment. The standard for excessive force to show excessive force was above the ladder in the Bartow County Sheriff's Office policies.

The case before the court was that six officers were dealing with Fennell and they were unable to extricate Huskey's arm. There was a greater need for a use of force in this case. Gilstrap was outside of the room when he heard an officer yelling for Fennell to release him. When Gilstrap entered the room Fennell was struggling with six officers. The court held in Cockrell,

we held that an officer's use of force to quiet an inmate who was shouting was reasonable under the circumstances. 510 F.3d at 1311. We reasoned that, guards may use force when necessary to restore order and need not wait until disturbances reach dangerous proportions before responding. Furthermore, We have held that when a prisoner created a disturbance by failing to follow a prison guard's instructions and shouting obscenities, it was not unreasonable for the guard to grab the prisoner by the throat and shove him against the prison bars. Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990). Indeed, we previously held that the use of force sufficient to break bones did not violate the Eighth Amendment under the circumstances even though the prisoner had not offered any physical resistance. Cockrell, 510 F.3d at 1311.

The court reasoned that Gilstrap as in Cockrell could not have foreseen that the injuries would have been as severe as they were. Furthermore, Gilstrap's kicks were to be on the arm and not intended to land on the face. There was video throughout the incident that supported the claim.

Fennell had displayed violence once he was placed into the police cruiser. When he was brought into detention he was shackled. He was struggling with six officers. They were unable to subdue him. Fennell grabbed Huskey's arm and would not release it. Gilstrap was reacting to the immediate threat to officer Huskey. The video does not indicate that Gilstrap acted in a malicious manner. Gilstrap was granted summary judgment to Gilstrap and the case dismissed.

Once again case law sets a higher standard than policy and procedures. In all reality Bartow County had in place procedures to prevent this type of incident. Those were intended to prevent serious injury as occurred. Although Gilstrap was terminated for the incident the court reviewed the incident and ruled for summary judgment.

About the Author

Randy Rider

Randy Rider has been employed as a law enforcement officer for 32 years. He is still an active law enforcement officer serving in the capacity of training and internal affairs. Over the course of his career he has conducted hundreds of investigations concerning abuse, neglect, and use of force by police and corrections officers.

Lieutenant Rider was elected president of the National Internal Affairs Investigators Association in May of 2005. The association has a members employed in agencies throughout the United States and Canada. Lieutenant Rider is also a national instructor for the Public Agency Training Council, Indianapolis, Indiana.

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