By Lt. Ed Pallas & Sgt. Al Uy (Ret.), Montgomery County Police Department, Maryland
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In a previous article ( http://www.officer.com/article/11587055/lessons-in-leadership-general-buford-at-the-battle-of-gettysburg ) we discussed Union General John Buford’s defensive actions on the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg and how they changed the face of the upcoming battle. We also examined the concept of followership, as defined by Robert Kelly, and applied it to General Buford’s command decisions.
In this article, we’ll continue the focus on the first day of battle and examine the opposing force, the confederates, who faced General Buford at the beginning of the battle. Confronted by General Buford of the Union Army, Confederate General Richard Stoddard Ewell made a critical decision at the end of the first day that is considered to have had great impact on the following two days of the battle. In our discussion, we will, once again, lean on Kelly’s categorization of followership styles.
General Ewell’s Decision
On June 28, 1863, General Ewell’s Second Corps led the Confederate advance into Pennsylvania from the north. General Ewell’s initial target of advance was Harrisburg, the state capital, but General Lee had lost track of the Union forces due to the lack of strategic information that Confederate cavalry General Jeb Stuart was to provide. General James Longstreet discovered, though the use of a spy, that Union forces had crossed the Potomac and were attempting to intercept General Lee. General Lee decided to regroup his scattered forces even though he felt General Longstreet’s spy was not entirely reliable. As part of the regrouping, General Lee ordered General Ewell’s second corps towards Gettysburg. General Harry Heth would be the first division commander under General Ewell to confront the Union forces in Gettysburg the summer of 1863.
On July 1, 1863, Gettysburg became the meeting point of the Union and Confederate forces. Union General Buford, the Union’s cavalry leader, was able to hold his defensive position in Gettysburg against a Confederate attack, led by General Harry Heth, a division commander under General Ewell. General Heth had decided to head into the town of Gettysburg with a strengthened reconnaissance force. This clash turned into a full day of fighting that resulted in a decisive victory for the confederates. Union forces were pushed out of the initial defensive position, but began to rally and regroup on Cemetery Hill at the end of the day.
General Ewell observes the regrouping on Cemetery Hill and initially is inclined to attack. He confers with his subordinates who suggest they need reinforcements in order to be successful. . General Ewell is advised by General Lee that there are no reinforcements and he will have to take the hill alone “if practicable,” but to “avoid a general engagement.” General Ewell decides not to attack and the Union forces take advantage of the cover of darkness to dig in and reinforce the positon. This piece of the battlefield became the anchor point for the Union’s line of defense that would include Culps Hill, Little Roundtop, and Roundtop. This decision became one of the most second-guessed decisions of the war. Many critics believe if General Ewell had pressed the advantage and taken Cemetery Hill, the outcome of the battle would have ended differently. Did General Ewell make the correct decision? Before answering this, let’s dig a little deeper into General Ewell’s leadership style.
General Ewell’s Leadership Style
General Ewell had been recently promoted to corps commander, replacing General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson. Jackson died on May 10, 1863, a week after being shot by his own troops during the Battle of Chancellorsville. Major General Ewell served under Jackson during the Valley Campaign. Jackson’s tendency was to keep his subordinates in the dark in regard to his tactical plans. General Ewell was initially resentful of this but eventually adapted to this style. This adaptation resulted in General Ewell’s becoming passive, requiring precise direction and specific orders before he would act.
Many knew General Jackson as an aggressive leader, whom General Lee referred to as his “right hand.” While Jackon was alive, his relationship and leadership style with Ewell was effective. As a division commander, General Ewell performed well, often defeating larger Union forces during the Valley Campaign.
After General Jackson’s death, General Lee restructured his two-corps approach and created a third corps. His reasoning was that each corps (containing approximately 30,000 troops at full strength) was too much for one general to manage in battle. So, with only General Longstreet left as a corps commander, General Lee had to add two new corps commanders. General Ewell and General Ambrose Powell Hill were promoted to corps commanders. General Longstreet had the first corps, General Ewell with the second corps, and General Hill the third corps.
As a new Corps Commander, General Ewell did not change his leadership style. He still required specific direction. The question to ask is did Lee realize this? Let us briefly examine Lee’s style of leadership and then answer the question as to whether Dick Ewell made the correct decision at the end of the first day of battle at Gettysburg?
Lee’s Leadership Style
What was General Lee’s leadership style with his commanders? General Lee could be described as a big-picture thinker. He liked to work out the overall strategy and order his units to the place of battle. When it came to the actual details of how to accomplish his strategic goals, he left those to his commanders. Prior to the Battle of Chancellorsville (April 1863), the Confederate Army was structured in a two-corps formation, commanded by General James Longstreet and General “Stonewall” Jackson. Lee was “hands-off” in his leadership style with these two men. This style worked well with these two commanders because they both were aggressive and understood the strategic goals set by General Lee. Each formulated their own approach to attaining those objectives. This relationship worked out well for all three commanders. Even though General Longstreet and General Jackson had their own styles and impetuous personalities, they were highly independent and effective leaders for their assigned units.
After the death of General Jackson and the appointment of General Ewell and General Hill, the leader-follower dynamic changed. General Ewell and General Hill did not possess the aggressiveness or competence of General Jackson and General Longstreet. We suggest General Lee needed to adapt his leadership style to suit the needs of his new direct-reports.
General Lee failed to understand his followers. He was hands-off with General Longstreet and General Jackson because they were exemplary followers. He knew how they would lead. General Ewell, in this case, was the x-factor in the equation. General Lee did not know General Ewell’s followership traits. Under Robert Kelley’s categorization of those who follow, General Ewell was not an exemplary follower but rather a passive one, as cultivated under Jackson.
The Correct Decision?
It has been a long day of hard fighting. The sun is setting and the day has been a clear victory for confederate forces. The advantage should be pressed by pursuing the retreating Union forces. Ewell confers with his subordinates, who all suggest a pursuit of the forces occupying Cemetery Hill, but only with reinforcements. Also there is information of a possible attack pending to Ewell’s flank. He asks Lee for reinforcements but is told there are none. He is then given the somewhat ambiguous order to take the hill if practicable. Ewell makes the correct—in our opinion—choice, and does not engage the enemy on Cemetery Hill.
We suggest the truly incorrect decision came from General Lee. If the same orders were given to General Jackson or General Longstreet, they, in all likelihood, would have taken the order to mean “Go take that hill” and they would have done so. General Ewell, on the other hand, was not General Jackson or General Longstreet. He took the order at face value and determined taking the hill was not practicable.
In essence, General Lee gave away the decision to General Ewell. He might have given away the decision but the ultimate responsibility for the outcome was with General Lee. If he wanted Cemetery Hill to be taken, he needed to issue specific and direct orders to General Ewell. Because he did not recognize the difference in followership styles he did not.
In Closing
Civil War officers were forced to make life-or-death decisions in a dynamic environment. We, the law enforcement leaders of today, must do so as well. We have to know those whom we lead. Understanding their followership styles and knowing our own leadership style will enable us to become effective and intentional decision-makers. Do you know the followership styles of the people you lead? Do you know how and when to delegate decision-making? As leaders, there are times and circumstances to delegate decisions. While we may delegate decisions to our followers, we may never delegate the responsibility for the outcomes of those decisions.
Next Gettysburg Leadership Course, May 23 – 25, 2016
About The Authors:
Lt. Edward Pallas, Ed.D.
Lieutenant Ed Pallas has been a police officer with the Montgomery County Department of Police, in Maryland, for 20 years. He is currently the Deputy Director of the Major Crimes Division. Ed is also a member of his department’s Emergency Response Team, where he has served as a Hostage Negotiator for the last 14 years.
Ed is the founder of Leader Armor, LLC, www.leaderarmor.com, a leadership training & consulting company. Ed is a certified by Master Instructor in the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Leadership in Police OrganizationsSM (LPO) program. He is also a certified practitioner in the Myers Briggs Personality Type Indicator (MBTI) and the Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i 2.0).
Ed earned his B.A degree in Criminal Justice from the University of Maryland and his M.S. in Management from Johns Hopkins University. Ed earned his Doctor of Education in Organizational Leadership from Wilmington University in Delaware.
Sgt. Al Uy (Ret)
Al is a retired police sergeant from the Montgomery County Police Department in Maryland. His experience in law enforcement has included patrol, community policing, mountain bicycle patrol, gang investigations, recruitment, district level investigations, firearms investigations, auto theft investigations, background investigations, and training academy operations. He was also a member of the Emergency Response Team (ERT) as a crisis/hostage negotiator.
He has previously presented topics on training, leadership and social media at the International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference and written articles on the topic of training for the IACP. He has continued his passion for simulations training and is working jointly with a technology company in Orlando, Florida and universities nationwide to further develop a unique speech recognition simulator specific for law enforcement de-escalation. He has a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Maryland and a Master of Science Degree from American Military University. He is the owner of Castellum Development Inc, a research and workforce solutions company for public safety.
